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-v-

Case No. 15328
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Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from the judgment of the Third Judicial District Court
for Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding.

JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR.
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

ROBERT GLEN BROWN,

Case No. 15328

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal proceeding in which the appellant,
ROBERT GLEN BROWN, was charged with the crimes of Theft by Deception,
Theft by Receiving and Transferring a Motor

Vehicle with an Altered

Vehicle Identification Number in the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried by jury before the Honorable James S.

t

Sawaya, District Court Judge on May 12, 16 and 17, 1977, and found
guilty of Theft by Deception, Theft by Receiving and Transferring

1

a Motor Vehicle with an Altered Vehicle

Identification Number.

Appellant was sentenced to the indeterminant terms as provided by law
and placed on probation.

As terms of that probation, appellant is

req'-lired to serve a term of six months in the County Jail and pay
!

restitution to the victim in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5, 000).
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1
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction or in the alternative, a new trial in the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Between 10:30 p.m. on October 14, 1976, and the morning of
October lS, 1976, a 1974 Chevrolet three-quarter ton pick-up truck
with a sleeper shell on the back was stolen from the driveway of
Marvin J. Butler (T. 8-9).

Butler reported the theft to the police

who were unable to locate the vehicle (T. 9).

On November 15, 1976,

Butler saw a Chevrolet pick-up parked at the residence of Duane
W. Lindsay of Sandy and notified the police.
This pick-up truck was later identified as the vehicle
stolen from Butler (T. 10 - 12).
At the trial, Duane Lindsay testified that he helped his
son, Larry, purchase a 1974 Chevrolet pick-up truck from the appellam,
1

Robert Glen Brown (T. S2 - SS).

Mr. Lindsay encountered the appellant I

at a construction site where the appellant told him about the vehicle I
which he desired to sell (T. S2).

The appellant sold Lindsay the

truck for Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000) and delivered the title
which indicated that Robert Greene was the previous owner (T. 54- 56).1
I

Jesse Labrum, owner of Labrum Auto Wrecking, testified that (
jC

he knew the appellant and had transacted business with him (T · 21 · -·J
Mr. Labrum stated that the appellant purchased a wrecked 1974 Chevrokl.
I
half-ton truck from him in November, 1976, after the appellant's
41
son had seen the truck in Labrum's yard two d ays earll. er (T. 23 - 2

i

The wrecked truck was missing the motor, transmission and hood, anc
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I

the understanding was that the appellant purchased the frame and
running gears of the vehicle, less the cab and bed (T. 34).

Labrum

testified that the appellant told him he had a cab and other parts
which he wanted to put on the truck and Labrum believed the truck
could be repaired in this way (T. 38).

At the time of the sale,

the appellant received the Certificate of Title to the wrecked truck
which was made out to Robert Greene (T. 29).
Hal Vincent, Special Agent with the National Automobile Theft
Bureau, testified that the vehicle

identification number (VIN) plate

was missing from the stolen 1974 pick-up truck found at the Lindsay
residence (T. 75, 76 - 77) and that the VIN derivative which is normally
stamped on the frame in the engine compartment was fictitious (T. 79).
Vincent stated that the original VIN derivative number had been ground
off the frame of the truck (T. 79 - 80).
and acid

By use of a potentiometer

solution, Vincent was able to identify the original number

stamped on the frame at the factory (T. 80 - 82).

Vincent testified

that the VIN which he reconstructed after determining the original
derivative number stamped on the frame matched the VIN of the truck
stolen from Mr. Butler (T. 85, 88).
Robert Glen Brown, Jr., the son of the appellant, testified
that he worked with his father and that he contacted Mr. Labrum with
respect to purchasing a wrecked 1974 Chevrolet pick-up in the early
part of November (T. 106, 109) and that his father subsequently
purchased that truck.

Brown, Jr. admitted that he painted the pick-up

truck sold to Lindsay approximately a week before the sale without
telling his father (T. 113 - 114).

He further testified that the

'Ppellant gave him a Promissory ~Tote and Eight Hundred Dollars ($800)
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cash to pay to one John Reynolds and that he never delivered the note
to John Reynolds but kept it hidden in his own truck until he returne:

.,

it to his father.

Brown, Jr. plead the Fifth Amendment privilege to ,

an inquiry as to when he first saw the truck which was sold to Linds)
and testified that the appellant first saw the truck when the witness

1

brought it to the shop approximately a week and a half before the
sale (T. 126 A - 127).

At the time the son brought the truck to his

father, it needed a paint job and was missing the tailgate.

Brown, Jrl!

stated on the stand that the Certificate of Title which he gave to his:
father when he brought the pick-up to the shop was phony and that he
later destroyed it and substituted the title of the wrecked truck
acquired from Labrum in its place (T. 144 - 145).

The son subsequent!;\

admitted to changing the VIN number on the Lindsay pick-up truck with·
out the knowledge of his father, the appellant (T. 147 - 148).
The appellant testified that he purchased the 1974 Chevrolet I
pick-up truck through his son on October 25, 1976.

He stated that he

I

first saw the truck when his son brought it to the shop after he
purchased it (T. 153).

The appellant stated that he did not check the

title and the VIN on the pick-up when he received it (T. 156).

J

I
I

The

appellant testified concerning the sale of the truck to Lindsay's son (

I

on November 8 or 9, 1976 (T. 156 - 157).

He further testified that

he bought a wrecked truck from Labrum on November 4, 1976.

The appell~

stated he had cab and transmission parts and access to a motor and
that he believed he could acquire the other necessary ]Jarts to rebuild

I
I

i

the truck and make a profit (T. 161 - 163).
On rebuttal, Jesse Labrum testified that on June 24, 1976,
the appellant purchased a wrecked 1976 Granada from him for Eisht Hun· '
dred and Ninety Two Dollars ($892) and that the appellant's son h"''
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initially seen the wrecked vehicle and then returned with the appellant
a few days later to pay a deposit on it (T. 201, 203).

The wrecked

Granada and the Certificate of Title thereto were delivered to
appellant (T. 201).
Gunner Mortensen testified that the 1976 Ford Granada which
was leased by his employer for his use was stolen from his driveway
in Salt Lake City on July 14, 1976 and never recovered (T. 205, 208).
Hal Vincent testified concerning the examination of a totally
burned and wrecked 1976 Granada in Las Vegas, Nevada on November 11,
1976.

Vincent found the VIN plate attached to the top of the dash.

Further examination of the wrecked automobile revealed a conflicting

VIN at a hidden location from which Vincent concluded that the whole
dash of the wrecked vehicle with the VIN plate intact and the engine
had been transferred and installed in the vehicle which he examined
(T. 210, 212, 213).

The VIN taken from the hidden location

identified

the vehicle as stolen according to the National Crime Information
Center (T. 210).

The VIN shown on the dash plate of the stolen vehicle

matched the VIN of the 1976 Granada sold by Labrum to the appellant
(T. 213) .

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING REBUTTAL EVIDENCE
OF AN ALLEGED PRIOR OFFENSE LACKING SUFFICIENT
PROBATIVE VALUE TO OUTWEIGH THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT
The rule in Utah is that evidence of other offenses alleged
to have been committed by the defendant is inadmissible at trial unless
shown that it has a special relevancy to prove an element of the crime
charged.
v.

State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 (1969), State

Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961), State v. Torgerson, 4
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Utah 2d 52, 286 P.2d 800 (1955).
The problem engendered by the use of evidence of other crime:
·

1

is that the trier of fact, being aware that a defendant has previous!·
broken the law, may conclude that a person who once manifests antisocL\
behavior is likely to do so on another occasion.

I

Thus, use of such

evidence may result in a conviction based on a thin thread of prior
wrongdoing.

I

I

The policy of exclusion of such evidence is set forth in

Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which also lists types of materiJ,
facts which might justify use of evidence of other crimes.

The purpos;
1

of the rule is to avoid the degradation of the defendant and the
implication that the defendant has a propensity for crime.

State

v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 (1963).
This case is markedly distinguishable from others decided
by this Court where the evidence of other alleged crimes was deemed
admissible.

In State v. Kappas, 100 Utah 265, 114 P.2d 205 (1941),

the defendants were charged with stealing sheep belonging to the Bast1{
and the defendants claimed they did not know there were any stray or
stolen sheep in their herd.

I

The Court ruled the testimony of a witnes 1

1

concerning another similar loss of sheep later found in the defendants\
herd was admissible to show that the act was not done innocently or bvl
I
mistake.
In State v. Schieving, 535 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1975), the
defendant was convicted of mishandling public monies and the Court
held that the admission of evidence of another shortage within the
Traffic Violations Bureau was not error.

More recently, this Court

held that evidence of other sales proceeds taken by the defendant was
admissible to show a corrn:non scheme or olan where the defendant was
charged with theft of monies from his el'lployer,
P.2d 775 (Utah 1977).

State v. Gaub~. Jc

In each of these instances, the defendants
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1

!

!

failed to present concrete evidence in support of their claims of
lack of knowledge or mistake.
In this case, the State submitted, over the appellant's
objection, evidence concerning a 1976 Ford Granada stolen in July,
1976 and a 1976 Granada purchased by the appellant from Labrum to
rebut the defense of lack of knowledge (T. 137, 200).

This evidence

was presented after the appellant's son testified that he substituted
the title and changed the vehicle

identification number on the stolen

pick-up without the appellant's knowledge.

In appellant's case, the

surrounding circumstances were revealed by the most definitive and
exculpatory evidence, the son's confession.

Therefore, the rebuttal

evidence only served to prejudice the jury and suggest that the
defendant had a crininal disposition.

State v. Torgerson, supra.

Further, the evidence of the alleged prior offense bore no
more distinctive marks tying the appellant to that wrongdoing

than

were present in the offense charged given the fact that the appellant
was in the business of buying, repairing and selling automobiles.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has adopted
the clear and convincing standard of proof for allegedly similar
offenses, which the appellant believes should be applied to the instant
case.

United States v. Beechum, 555 F.2d 487 (C.A. 5, 1977), United

States v. Broadway, 477 F.2d 991 (C.A. 5, 1973).
is used by the Eighth Circuit.

The same standard

United States v. Spica, 413 F.2d 129

(C.A. 8, 1969), Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d 794 (C.A. 8, 1956).
In Broadway, the defendant was charged with transporting and causing

- 7 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to be transported in interstate commerce a falsely made and forged
money order.

At the trial, the court allowed additional money orce:

signed by the defendant to be received in evidence for the purpose
of showing intent and guilty knowledge.

The Court of Appeals state:

By the requirement that evidence of other crimes be
plain, clear and conclusive, the probative value of
the evidence is held to outweigh the possibility
of prejudice to the defendant. We see no reason for
the rule to differ as to the nature of the proof
required [in] a situation where the proof of other
offenses is offered to shore up a weak case as to intent
and guilty knowledge, as in the case at bar.
(477 F.2d
at 995.]
The Court of Appeals went on to hold the evidence was inadmissibile
and the defendant entitled to a reversal, stating:
Our holding is simply that when proof of an assertedly
similar offense is tendered to establish necessary
intent, the other offense proved must include the
essential physical elements of the offense charged,
and these physical elements, but not the mental
ingredients of the offenses must be clearly shown by
competent evidence.
[447 F.2d at 995.]
In this case, the evidence showed only that appellant purchased a wrecked Granada from Labrum and parts of that vehicle were
found on a Granada stolen from Salt Lake City.

There was no proof

that the appellant exercised control of the stolen Granada which co:;:
prove his guilt

or knowledge of the offense charged and thus the

rebuttal evidence lacked probative value with respect to the chargec
offenses and was inadmissible.
CONCLUSION
The trial court cormnitted prejudicial error in admitting r:o
rebuttal evidence of the possible prior wrongdoing of appellanr fc~
two reasons.

First, the classic circumstance fCJr admission of pric:

bad acts is in rebuttal to the defense of lack of knowledge or ir:'
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But, because appellant's son confessed to the col!Ililission of the offense,
during the trial, the appellant's defense became more than just lack
of knowledge.

In the face of such a defense it was improper to admit

evidence of those prior acts.

Secondly, the proof or substantiation

of the prior crime was no more substantial than the evidence presented
at trial.

This, coupled with the fact that appellant is in the business

of buying, repairing and selling automobiles means that the prosecution
was using the innuendo of wrongdoing from one transaction to cure
defects in their present case.
Respectfully submitted,

JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR.
Attorney for Appellant
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